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This is a network, a set of nodes and the links between them. Osama bin Laden 
was not the only decision maker, the only one with authority in the organization. 
Far-flung elements made decisions and carried out operations as seemed best to 
them. As the author’s description unfolds, however, it becomes clear that one 
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This is a hierarchy. As the report of the 9/11 commission makes clear, even 
though the structure of al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks was not rigid, and lines of 
command and control not always simple and clear, not all the nodes in al Qaeda 
were equal in authority.2 Some individuals in the organization had more 
authority than others and were “higher,” so to speak, in the organizational chart 
than others. 
Was al Qaeda a network or a hierarchy? Is it now a leaderless jihad?3 Actually, 
these questions do not matter. The most important issue for an organization or 
those fighting it is not what structure it has. The most important issue is how well 
an organization’s structure is adapted to its environment, which includes what its 
enemies are doing, given what the organization wants to achieve and the 
resources available to it. No one organizational structure is always inherently 
superior to another. Some are better for some things, some for others. These 
principles apply to al Qaeda as well as the governmental network (the federal, 
state, and local governments) in the United States. Hence, if we examine two 
contending organizations in their environments, we may be able to discern 
optimal strategies for these organizations. With regard to the United States, the 
optimal strategy turns out to be the opposite of what is or has been commonly 
recommended. Once we understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
networks and hierarchies, particularly the foreign and domestic militant Islamic 
networks that we confront, we see that it does not take a network to fight a 
terrorist network and that it is not very helpful to emphasize the killing and 
capturing of high-value terrorist targets. Instead, we see that we should 
deemphasize the direct fight against these networks and put more emphasis on 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
To see this in detail, we will consider first some basic differences among 
organizations and the strengths and weaknesses of two different organizational 
forms (networks and hierarchies); then apply this organizational analysis to 
terrorist organizations and the governmental network in the United States; and, 
finally, suggest optimal strategies for countering the terrorist threats we face.  
The initial discussion of organizational forms will be somewhat simplified (e.g., it 
assumes a clear distinction between networks and hierarchies that is ultimately 
untenable) in order to emphasize certain organizational characteristics or 
tendencies. 
DIFFERENCES AMONG ORGANIZATIONS 
One way to understand the differences among organizations is to focus on two 
key variables: frequency of personal contact and the location of authority. In a 
market, individuals deal with each other once or infrequently and authority has 
no location. The price mechanism structures the market, not any authority 
separate from the price mechanism. Individuals can have recurring contact in a 
market but in that case what tends to develop is a network. A contractor might 
conclude that it is more efficient to deal with one or two carpenters, for example.  
Both the contractor and the carpenters benefit from this arrangement. Price is 
still important but a personal connection and some degree of trust also keeps the 
network together. The contractor has ultimate responsibility for how the work is 
done, and to discharge that responsibility will tell the carpenters what needs to be 
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done, but he trusts them and cedes some authority to them to get the work done 
right and even to suggest better ways to do it based on their expertise. All 
participants in this construction network share some authority and control over 
their relationships. If for some reason the general contractor thinks he needs 
more authority over the carpenters and other skilled personnel he needs to 
complete his projects (when the number or the complexity of the projects 
increases, for example), he might hire them permanently. A company would then 
have formed. The general contractor would become the boss and the others 
would work for him. The boss’ contact with his employees would be recurring but 
authority would more clearly reside in him. Trust might well diminish, especially 
if the company is large, because the boss will not know the individuals who are 
actually doing the work as well as the contractor in the network example did. The 
network would have become a hierarchy.4 
What distinguishes both a network and a hierarchy from a market is that in the 
network contact among the members is recurring. What distinguishes a network 
from a hierarchy is that in the latter the recurring contacts take place within a 
framework of legitimate or accepted authority. In a hierarchy, information flows 
up from the bottom and decisions and information flow down from the top. Rank 
and authority go together; the higher one’s rank in the organization, the more 
authority one has. Forms of authority other than those derived from rank exist in 
a hierarchy, such as authority based on technical expertise, but rank can and may 
trump these other kinds of authority; in a hierarchy, rank confers ultimate 
authority. Rules and regulations express that authority. Those lower in the 
hierarchy have less say in making the rules and regulations, but are bound by 
them and therefore have less autonomy and less room to exercise initiative than 
those above them. The lower in the hierarchy one is, the more restricted and 
specialized is one’s task, typically. This division of labor, supervised at each level, 
and denial of initiative means that trust is not very important in a hierarchical 
organization. Each level knows what those below are supposed to do (this is often 
specified in writing) and works to see that it gets done. No one relies on trust 
alone to see that those below them in the hierarchy do their jobs. 
The hierarchical structure presented (perhaps caricatured) here offers 
advantages and disadvantages.5 It is a good way to organize a mass of poorly 
educated workers, for example. They do not have the knowledge or the skills to be 
trusted to operate efficiently or effectively on their own, so they need to learn to 
do simple tasks and be carefully supervised to see that they do them. In this 
setting, there is accountability. The boss at the top can find out what each of his 
workers or production lines has produced and, if it is not producing enough, 
knows exactly whom to blame. Such a structure allows for fast and efficient 
implementation of decisions, once they are made at the top.  The boss and every 
supervisor below the boss have the authority to impose change on every member 
of the organization. In the context of the U.S. government, a hierarchical military 
structure was a good way to organize a mass of poorly educated soldiers into an 
effective fighting force. Especially within its tradition of attrition warfare, in 
which it sought to apply uniformly the greatest possible degree of firepower to 
overwhelm its opponents,6 the U.S. military found a highly developed 
hierarchical structure congenial. In the bureaucracy, the accountability of 
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hierarchy is also a great boon for those who care about the rule of law. Those who 
represent us in the legislature and wield our power and implement it through the 
bureaucracy can in principle find out exactly who made which decisions and who 
wrote which memos. 
Balancing the advantages of the hierarchy are certain disadvantages. It may be 
that implementation of decisions can happen quickly in a bureaucracy once the 
decisions are made but it is also true that the information needed to make those 
decisions may flow to the decision makers slowly because it must go through so 
many levels. Not only do the levels slow information transfer and, ultimately, 
decision making, but they may well distort it. Even inadvertently, as information 
passes through many hands, it changes, much as the message that begins the 
children’s game of “telephone” emerges garbled at the end of the line of children 
who have transmitted it. But there may also be malicious distortion.  Each level in 
a bureaucracy may have its own interests. Refracted through those interests as it 
moves along, information may arrive at the top both too slowly and as a distorted 
image. 
Whether the various advantages and disadvantages of hierarchies predominate 
depends on the environment in which the hierarchies must survive. As suggested 
above, in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, hierarchically organized 
factories and armies may well have been the best way to take advantage of masses 
of relatively uneducated workers and conscripts. As the education and 
capabilities of workers and conscripts or volunteers improve, that may no longer 
be the case, at least to the same degree. The relative advantages and 
disadvantages of organizational forms is not just a question of the time in which 
they operate, however. For example, firms that operate internationally may profit 
from a different form of organization. In this case, a head office could not know 
what would work best in a variety of different countries around the world, so it 
would make sense to send its authority down and out to branches operating 
overseas. This flattening of authority was made possible by improved 
communication and information technology that lowered the cost of doing 
business even over vast distances. This flattening also gives more autonomy to 
lower levels and thus requires that a certain amount of trust move down and out 
as well.  
Compared to the strict hierarchical model, the flattened structure described 
above should see an increase in the speed with which information moves to the 
decision-making level (because the decision-making level has moved lower) and 
less distortion of information (because it travels through fewer levels to reach 
decision makers and, in this case, fewer cultural filters). The result should be 
faster and more accurately informed decision making. In the context of the U.S. 
military, one might think of the regional commands as an example of this 
flattened hierarchy. Within at least one of these commands this flattening has led 
to experiments with additional flattening.7 Certain disadvantages balance the 
advantages of the flattened structure, however. First, faster, better-informed 
decision making may not necessarily be better decision making. Faster decision 
making may mean in some cases that bad decisions are made faster. 
Furthermore, the original or central hierarchy loses some control over the 
components to which it has distributed authority. The loss of control means that 
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there may also be an increase in the difficulty of implementing any decisions that 
the center arrives at. For example, the Pentagon gave the Special Operations 
Command authority over the global war on terrorism but the regional commands 
resisted.8 Finally, from the viewpoint of the center, there will be less 
accountability or a decreased ability to identify who exactly is responsible for 
which decisions. All of this is the consequence of delegating authority down and 
out from a central hierarchy.   
If the workers involved in an activity are well-educated and what they must do 
cannot be reduced to simplified tasks performed repetitively but requires 
initiative and creativity, then a further flattening may be necessary to gain the full 
value of their work. Ultimately, the flattening may continue until it reaches what 
was described above as a network, a set of recurring interactions without any 
legitimate or accepted central authority controlling or directing them. The 
members of such an organization might be linked by nothing more than a 
common purpose and, implicitly at least, a good deal of trust that each is serving 
that common purpose. As noted, such an organization would be well suited to 
take advantage of highly skilled, motivated members. In such an organization, 
given the absence of layers between actors, information should flow as freely as it 
can and with as little distortion as possible. This should make the network highly 
responsive and adaptive to its surroundings. It should also be resilient, since if 
one node runs into trouble, others can carry on. An example of such a network 
would be the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which started with six 
non-governmental organizations united by the common purpose of banning land 
mines and grew to include numerous organizations sharing that purpose. With 
no central authority dictating how members of the coalition should act, the 
Campaign managed within five years to get a treaty banning land mines signed by 
122 nations,9 out-maneuvering the traditional hierarchical bureaucracies that 
opposed it. 
The network form does have disadvantages, however. It has no formal control 
over its members, although peer pressure might operate. The trust it relies on 
might well be misplaced. If the activity one is involved in requires centralized 
control, managing military fire support, for example,10 or the flow of resources to 
a disaster area, then decentralized authority is not best. In networks, there is also 
less accountability. This is not to say that in hierarchies there is always 
accountability. But the failures in accountability that we see in hierarchies are 
precisely that, failures.  Accountability is inherent in a hierarchy and when it does 
not occur, whether negligently or intentionally, it is a failure. A network is 
defined in a sense as an organization in which no one has the authority to hold 
someone else accountable. Individuals or nodes in a network may in fact hold 
someone accountable (“I won’t get that jerk to do my wiring again,” says the 
disgruntled contractor) but that is a personal not an organizational decision. Over 
time in a network, the individual decisions of practitioners when communicated 
among members may begin to coalesce into an accepted set of standards of 
conduct, supported by peer pressure. The next step is that the network or 
community establishes mechanisms to enforce these standards. At this point, 
there is organizational accountability and some form of hierarchical relationship 
among the members of the organization or community.  
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We may summarize the different advantages and disadvantages of hierarchies 
and networks as follows. Hierarchies, or more exactly organizations with 
centralized control, provide accountability and can enforce standards. They also 
can implement decisions more quickly and efficiently than networks, or 
organizations without centralized control, but they may make those decisions 
more slowly than the speed at which their environment is changing, since 
information must travel through many layers to get to decision makers. In 
addition, the information may be distorted when it arrives. This means 
organizations with centralized authority may not be as responsive and adaptable 
as they need to be given the changes occurring in their environment. This means 
in turn that they face the long-term risk of extinction. Also, a centralized 
organization may not be very resilient. If the center suffers catastrophic failure, 
the whole organization is at risk. Networks, on the other hand, respond more 
quickly to their environments because every node is in effect a sensor and a 
decider. Information does not have to go anywhere to be effective. It is also the 
case that as information from all the sensor-decider nodes travels through the 
network, the members in effect get to sample various ways of adapting to the 
environment, which increases the adaptability of the network over time. As nodes 
communicate, they get to see what works and what does not, which allows the 
nodes and ultimately the network to deal with mistakes and distorted 
information in a way that is more efficient and effective than the way that a 
hierarchy does. Decentralized organizations are also more resilient. If one node 
fails, the whole network does not fail. But the lack of centralized control over 
members of the network means that what the network does in toto (the sum of 
the actions of the individual nodes) is unpredictable. This generates the risk that 
in the short-term individual nodes will do something that adversely affects the 
whole network. This means that network organizations suffer from short-term 
risks, even as their adaptability lowers their long-term risk. Finally, networks 
make accountability more difficult, since authority is diffuse and control limited 
or non-existent. 
In addition to noting that different kinds of organizations offer different 
advantages and disadvantages and are more or less suited to different kinds of 
tasks in different kinds of environments, we should note that the stark categories 
of “centralized” or “decentralized” are too rigid for what we encounter in the 
world. Organizations are some blend of centralization and decentralization.  
Hierarchies have networks in them, either formal (e.g., interagency coordinating 
groups) or informal (e.g., those who served on the president’s or governor’s 
campaign). And most networks contain at least informal authority hierarchies.  
In the campaign to ban landmines, the original NGOs and a few individuals 
(either because of their experience or personal characteristics) had more 
authority as a matter of fact than other NGOs or individuals. One analysis of 
decentralized organizations offers Hezbollah as an example of such 
organizations, saying of it that “although the formal structure is highly 
bureaucratic, interactions among the members are volatile and do not follow 
rigid lines of control.”11 This remark shows the blend of centralism and 
decentralism that exists in organizations.  Since the remark could equally apply to 
the U.S. federal bureaucracy, it also reminds us that structures that are reputed to 
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be quite different (a hierarchical bureaucracy and a networked terrorist 
organization) may in fact not be completely dissimilar, a point to which we will 
return. All of this supports the contention that the important issue is not whether 
an organization is a hierarchy or centralized, or a network or decentralized, but 
how well its structure is adapted to the activities the organization carries out and 
the environment in which it carries them out. 
TERRORISM AND NETWORKS 
How do these distinctions among organizations apply to terrorists? To see how 
they do, we should start with an account of how someone becomes a terrorist that 
ignores the organizational distinctions. This account puts the emphasis on an 
individual:  if one has a grievance, one must decide what to do about it. If the 
costs of correcting the problem are greater than the costs imposed by the 
problem, then one might decide to do nothing.  In a totalitarian state, this is the 
common calculation. But if it appears that something can be done at a cost that is 
less than the cost imposed by the problem, then one must decide what to do. 
Perhaps the most important choice is whether to seek redress through peaceful or 
violent means. The peaceful path leads to some sort of overt activity, 
participation in a political party or a demonstration perhaps. One might be 
arrested at the demonstration or simply go home after it.  In either case, one is 
back where one started. One might well continue on this peaceful path – a 
repeating cycle of protest, arrest, and release, for example – especially if it 
seemed to be doing some good. But one might also decide that peaceful protest is 
insufficient.  The alternative – violent resistance – obviously has higher costs, not 
just arrest but perhaps imprisonment or even death. Given that the possibility of 
successfully redressing grievances through violence is so remote (in the 
beginning, those using violence are few and weak, their opponents many and 
strong), why would anyone choose this path? 
The overwhelming evidence is that the choice for violence or the life of a 
terrorist is not made typically in the individualistic way in which we have just 
presented it. The choice occurs in the context or with the help of networks of 
relationships. For example, the anti-war movement in the United States in the 
1960s and 1970s was a network of individuals and organizations, the vast 
majority of which believed in working peacefully within the system, as the saying 
was then. A small number of those involved in the anti-war movement separated 
themselves into the Students for a Democratic Society, which had a more militant 
approach. From this group there eventually emerged the violent clandestine 
group known as the Weathermen. A similar movement can be seen from animal 
rights supporters, to an organization like People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), and on to the violent Animal Liberation Front. Another example 
would be the movement of Ayman al-Zawahiri, typically described as al Qaeda’s 
number two, from the umma, or Islamic community of Egypt, through the 
Mulsim Brotherhood, to Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization, and on 
to al Qaeda.    
The same process is evident in groups like those that carried out the 9/11 and 
London attacks or have plotted to carry out similar attacks in the United States. 
Typically, there is a group of people who are already friends, or friends of friends, 
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who share an interest in Islam. They discuss their evolving beliefs and encourage 
each other. At some point, they might come into contact with an authoritative 
teacher, who furthers their movement toward militant Islam. Also, one individual 
within the group might emerge as its leader, as the one most interested in taking 
action. He might, with or without the assistance of the spiritual advisor, arrange 
to travel to Afghanistan or Pakistan for some training. As their religious thought 
becomes more radical and their plans mature, the group may take on the vague 
shape of an organization, with some members being responsible for raising 
money, while others, perhaps with background information acquired in 
university chemistry courses, develop skills at bomb making, all under the 
guidance of the operational and spiritual leaders.     










The groups that carry out the attack arise within the world of expatriate Islam, 
which forms a ghetto in a cultural, if not a geographic sense, drawing in converts, 
who sometimes turn out to be the most committed to the militant cause. Not only 
does the small group encourage each of its members in the process of 
radicalization, but the small group draws support from the networks of religious 
groups and brotherhoods that operate within the Islamic world. Finally, as the 
group comes closer and closer to a willingness to use violence, it may find 
operational support in the network of militants that can transport people from 
Europe to South Asia and back again.12 
In the cases we have just briefly considered, networks of relationships aided 
the mobilization and recruitment process. The array of pre-existing social 
networks involved in this process include family (or kin and tribe), ethnic group, 
religious organization, occupation, education and residence.13 These threads, 
knitted together through daily life, create a dense fabric that at each step supports 
the mobilization process. With regard to small groups, by and large there are two 
types of explanations for how this support works, one psychological, the other 
sociological. Psychologists have documented what they call group extremity shift 
or the tendency of a group of people to move toward a more extreme expression 
of the group’s dominant view. Typically, no one in a group wants to be left behind 
or left out. Even reluctantly, people tend to move with the group.  If the group is 
clandestine and at danger from the authorities, appearing to be the laggard might 
even suggest disloyalty. Thus members of a group, particularly members of a 
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clandestine group, have an incentive not to lag behind and even to prove 
themselves the most fervent members of the group.14 A sociologist examining 
how networks support social movements has identified three ways in which they 
do this. First, networks perform a socialization function, helping members sort 
out who they are as they interact with the trusted members of the network.  
Second, network connections help create opportunities to participate, from the 
first study group that someone attends, to training in bomb making. Third, 
network relationships affect calculations of costs and benefits.15 What another 
study has called the “social and behavioral dynamics of small groups”16 make the 
decision for terrorism – to benefit the group even at one’s expense – more 
plausible than it might be if one were calculating costs and benefits by oneself 
and only with regard to oneself. Beyond these small groups, which arise out of 
pre-existing social networks, other large transnational networks assist in 
mobilization, if only by providing information through the internet.  
What is true of social movements generally is true even more so of the violent 
clandestine groups that emerge from these movements. Pre-existing social 
networks make possible violent clandestine organizations because these 
organizations cannot recruit openly.17 What is true of social movements and 
violent clandestine groups generally may be even truer of Islamic movements and 
violent clandestine groups. The relationship between social networks, dissidence, 
and violent groups is perhaps more pronounced in Islam than in other traditions. 
Mohamed himself recruited among family and friends and built his movement by 
relying on various pre-existing social networks. According to one scholar of 
Islam, the hostility that greeted Mohamed’s teaching required that his movement 
operate at first as a “secret society.” Pre-existing social networks, particularly his 
clan, allowed him and his followers to survive and their movement to grow. 
Mohamed’s “political acumen and astute leadership” were also necessary, of 
course, but would not have been effective without pre-existing social networks 
within which to work. Ultimately, through his political work and military 
campaigns, Mohamed built a movement that transcended the social networks 
with which he began. Scholars have noted that within the Islamic world of the 
Middle East, the model of the Prophet remains effective. Both those who hold 
political power and those who aspire to it have used and continue to use and 
manipulate a variety of social networks to mobilize people and build their 
movements.18   
One thing that characterizes these movements is an organizational style in 
which “lines of authority and responsibility tend to be fluid and blurred.” The 
leader and his relationships are paramount but authority is not exercised through 
clearly established organizational lines. “Even when institutions such as formal 
bureaucracies have developed, the real business of ruling and political decision 
making has resided in personal networks.”19 In this light, the description of 
Hezbollah given earlier (a bureaucracy without rigid lines of control) does not 
represent the emergence of a new organization form20 but the reliance on a 
centuries-old technique of mobilization.21 We can see even in the emergence of 
the small groups that attacked the United States on 9/11 and the London metro 
system in 2005 a replication of the Prophet’s methods, if not his intention. Non-
violent Islamic groups also use these techniques, of course, (as do groups that are 
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not Islamic) but as noted above, such techniques are particularly useful for 
violent groups that cannot publicize what they are about. As has been the case for 
centuries, the leaders of these groups benefit, for example, from the traditional 
decentralized ways that Muslims give and distribute alms (the zakat).  
Network forms of organization are particularly useful for mobilizing, then.  
Yet, if we consider networks from the perspective of those who recruit or build 
organizations and try to manage violent politics, we can see that these networks 
are problematic. Consider the case of the loosely structured group that carried 
out the attacks on the USS Sullivans (January 2000, which failed), USS Cole 
(October 2000), and the French tanker Limbourg (October 2002). Abd al Rahim 
al Nashiri was the leader of this group. He had the idea of attacking U.S. naval 
vessels and got bin Ladin to support it. He went to Yemen to organize.  A veteran 
of fighting in Afghanistan, Nashiri contacted in Yemen other veterans or people 
with some relationship to bin Ladin. One of these was Waleed Mohammed Bin 
Attash (aka Khallad), an associate of bin Laden who had useful local knowledge 
and contacts. He bought the explosives for the group’s operations locally, for 
example. Also assisting were others with connections to bin Ladin or Attash or 
through them to the Aden Islamic Army. 
The group’s first effort against the USS Sullivans failed when they put too 
much explosive in their boat and it sank. The second effort against the USS Cole 
worked. The third attack also succeeded in that they hit a target, the Limbourg, 
but it was a failure in a larger sense. When it occurred, the attack on the 
Limbourg was thought by analysts to be part of a strategy to attack the West 
economically by attacking its oil supply. In fact, the attack took place not as the 
result of a carefully planned strategy but because members of the group were 
upset that one of their acquaintances had been killed by the government of 
Yemen. The group lashed out at the first target it could find. Because the group 
struck a commercial vessel, insurance rates for the waters near Yemen increased 
substantially. This led to a decrease of traffic into the Yemeni port of Aden, which 
in turn cut the revenues of the Yemeni government. The government responded 
by cracking down on the group.  Members and associates were arrested.22 
The case of the Cole bombers shows the utility of networks for mobilization 
and recruitment. Nashiri’s organizational work was made much easier by the fact 
that he could exploit pre-existing social networks in Yemen. Yet, those networks 
posed problems for Nashiri and bin Laden. Network connections do not cease to 
exist when individuals or nodes in them join a clandestine violent organization.23  
As we have discussed, one characteristic of networks is the freedom of the nodes 
to respond to their environment. While this makes the network adaptive, it also 
can lead to short-term failure, as we noted.  This is illustrated in the case of the 
Cole bombing group. The network connections to an individual outside the group 
led the group to make an ill-considered operational decision that in turn led to 
the compromise not just of those directly involved in the Cole bombing but of 
many members of the larger network from which the bombing group was drawn.  
If an organization has fluid and blurred lines of control and authority, which has 
tended to be true of organizations in the Middle East, then it will be hard for 
leaders to impose strategic direction on the organization. We see another 
example of this in the letter of Ayman al-Zawahiri to the former leader of al 
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Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zawahiri wrote that Zarqawi’s actions 
were discrediting the al Qaeda movement but he had almost no control over 
Zarqawi to correct this problem.24 
Not only will decentralized organizations have trouble with strategy, security is 
likely to be a problem for them as well. Pre-existing social networks are 
important for violent clandestine groups or those who want to start one because 
these groups are at risk.  If an organizer wants to recruit someone, he must think 
about whether the person he approaches will turn him in. To minimize risk, 
organizers turn to those they trust and those they trust are in the social networks 
to which they belong.  What constitutes a trustworthy relationship may vary from 
culture to culture,25 but the need for such relationships in risky clandestine 
activity is universal. Again, however, these relationships do not simply cease to 
exist when the nodes or individuals that form them enter the violent clandestine 
group. If there is no central authority to impose discipline over communication 
and other operational and personal matters, then the pre-existing relationships 
may become, in fact, the bread crumbs that the authorities can follow to identify 
members of the clandestine organization.26  A cell structure can enhance security, 
but only if the cells are compartmented; that is, if the links between the cells or 
nodes are kept to a minimum. To do this requires that discipline or authority 
exist over the cells and those in them. In other words, limited linkages between 
cells or nodes imposed and enforced by a higher or superior authority creates 
better security but it also crates a centralized organization (hierarchy) not a 
decentralized one (network).   
Organizing through networks of trusted individuals also poses another 
problem for clandestine organizations. One way to understand this is through the 
analysis of Mark Granovetter.27 Granovetter used the idea of strong and weak ties 
between people to think about different kinds of social relations and processes.  
He defined a strong tie as “a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, 
the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.”28 Granovetter argued that the diffusion 
through society of ideas or innovations, for example, would occur more readily 
through weak ties than strong ones because if I talk to someone with whom I 
have only a weak tie, that person is likely to spend more time with other people 
than with me (our weak tie means we do not spend much time together) and 
therefore is more likely to spread an innovation or ideas to someone with whom I 
have not already spoken. The difficulty for those involved in clandestine activities 
is that the risk they operate under tends to lead them to contact or recruit people 
with whom they have strong ties.29  This explains the intuition that clandestine 
groups will have a harder time spreading their ideas through society than groups 
that are not clandestine. Over time, it is even likely that the strong ties that 
members of at-risk clandestine groups rely on are among people already within 
the clandestine world. Thus, members of clandestine organizations have a 
tendency to end up talking amongst themselves and become increasingly 
isolated. As they become isolated and subject to “group think,” they are more 
likely to misjudge their environment and make strategic blunders.30  
We may say, therefore, with regard to violent clandestine organizations, that 
decentralized organizations or networks are best for mobilizing resources and 
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recruiting but that they are worse for security and strategic direction. On the 
other hand, centralized or hierarchical organizations are best for security and 
strategic direction but worse for mobilizing resources and recruiting. To get an 
optimal result, an organizer should try, to the degree possible, to modify his 
organization so that in a given environment it is situated on the centralized-
decentralized continuum in such a way as to maximize the benefits and minimize 
the costs of each kind of organization.  A key consideration will be the level of risk 
to the organization in the operational environment. Generally speaking, the more 
at risk the organization, the more centralized the organization should be.31  The 
organizer’s dilemma, however, remains that security and strategic direction, on 
the one hand, and mobilization of resources on the other are both necessary for 
organizers to succeed but that the former is best done through a centralized 
organization and the latter through a decentralized one.   
STRATEGY 
Strategic implications follow from the requirements of clandestine organizations 
and the structures that best serve these requirements. If we are dealing with a 
movement that has a historic and cultural tendency toward decentralized 
authority, we may surmise from the foregoing analysis that this movement will be 
better at mobilizing and recruiting than at maintaining security and imposing 
strategic direction.32  It is the “network” functions of this movement that are its 
strength and its “hierarchical” functions that are its weakness. If we attack the 
network, we are attacking our opponent’s strength, a dubious strategic choice.  
This is one way to understand why a strategy of killing or capturing high-value 
targets (i.e., key personnel in the movement) is unlikely to be decisive, although it 
may provide tactical advantages in some circumstances. We have managed to kill 
or capture a large number of al Qaeda leaders and drove the organization itself 
out of Afghanistan, but it has reconstituted itself in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas of Pakistan.33 As in any organization, the leadership of a 
decentralized movement is the end product of a mobilization and recruitment 
process. In the case of the Islamic movements that we oppose, this process is 
deeply rooted in social structures and in historical and cultural traditions, 
sanctified by the example of the Prophet. It is powerful and effective.  We are 
unlikely to defeat it by attacking it or its end product directly. Trying to do so 
would be a strategic error. Defeating the mobilization and recruitment process 
directly would require disrupting or destroying the structures and traditions 
through which it thrives. But this would require transforming large portions of at 
least the Middle East. Beginning that transformation was, ultimately, the purpose 
of invading Iraq. 
We would compound this strategic error if we tried to make ourselves more 
networked on the assumption that it takes a network to fight a network.34  In the 
strategic struggle between those who use terrorism and those who oppose them, 
the side that wins is generally the side that best controls and limits its use of 
force.35 This is because terrorism and efforts to counter it are not a war or a battle 
of firepower. The struggle takes place amidst a population and over its opinions, 
rather than between two military forces separated from civilians. Civilian 
populations are sensitive to the violence inflicted on them. Unlike organized 
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military forces, they are not trained or equipped to function in the midst of 
violence. Winning the struggle over the opinions of civilian populations requires, 
then, that violence be controlled and limited. Centralized authority is best for 
controlling and limiting the use of force because centralized authority implies 
control over the nodes in an organization. Shortening the distance between the 
sensor and those who decide what to shoot, so that ultimately sensing and 
deciding to shoot occur in the same node and almost simultaneously, is an 
advantage only when bringing firepower to bear most efficiently is the key to 
success. That is not the key to success in our conflict with the al Qaeda 
movement. Because that movement’s mobilization and recruitment functions are 
so good and we operate under strategic, political, and legal constraints on the use 
of force, control of the use of force and thus separating the sensor and the 
decision to shoot is to our advantage. For the same reason, the other constraints 
under which we operate, such as bureaucratic rules and regulations and respect 
for civil liberties, which have limited the application of the government’s power 
over individuals, are also to our advantage. All of this requires that we fight 
decentralized authority, a network, with centralized authority, a hierarchy.  In 
this sense, it takes a hierarchy to fight a network.36 
A standard objection to reliance on centralized authority against a 
decentralized opponent is that the opponent will make decisions faster than the 
centralized authority and thus adapt more quickly. As we have argued, speed, 
agility, and adaptability are in fact advantages of a decentralized organization.  
Speed in decision making or adaptability is a good thing, however, as we have 
also argued, only if the decisions quickly made are well made. If bad decisions are 
made, making them quickly is not an advantage. There is at least one reason to 
think that centralized organizations may be better at long-term strategic thinking 
than decentralized organizations. A division of labor tends to be a characteristic 
of centralized organizations. This means that centralized organizations are likely 
to have people who specialize in strategic thinking and long-term planning and a 
command and control function that can distribute their thinking throughout the 
organization. Decentralized organizations will tend not to have specialists.  Small 
nodes in particular will probably favor generalists, since they will not have the 
resources to support specialization. Not having people who specialize in strategic 
thinking and long-term planning, networks, we may surmise, will on average not 
be as good at these activities as centralized organizations. One might argue that 
networks, as transitory and shifting coalitions, do not need long-term planning or 
that their strength is that this “planning” is distributed throughout the network.  
But in this case, the network can no more be said to plan than a market can be 
said to plan the distribution of the resources that flow through it. In any event, 
networks that aspire to be something more than transitory (can transitory 
networks produce fundamental political change?) will suffer from their lack of a 
strategic planning capability. This will decrease the advantage that their 
adaptability offers them. On the other hand, the possibility of having a robust 
strategic planning capability helps offset the long-term risk of extinction that 
centralized organizations suffer from because of their impaired ability to sense 
their environment and change accordingly. 
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With regard to strategic planning, the liability that centralized organizations 
function under is not so much in doing such planning, although this too may be a 
problem if the planning must occur among several centralized organizations, as 
in implementing it. Centralized organizations are notorious for not playing well 
together. Hence, the long-standing concerns and complaints about the lack of 
cooperation and coordination among the organizations that make up the national 
security apparatus of the U.S. government.37 Given the important advantages that 
centralized organizations provide, the solution to this problem of inter-
organizational cooperation should not diminish those advantages. It should 
somehow produce a squared circle. It should respect the authority and turf 
consciousness necessary to produce effective military officers, diplomats, law 
enforcement and public health officers, firefighters, and spies, and the 
perspectives and initiatives they produce, which are partial, but necessarily and 
advantageously so (for example, military force is often at best only part of a 
solution but someone should specialize in advising about its use and employing it 
effectively). Simultaneously, the solution should limit this authority and turf 
consciousness sufficiently to produce integrated and effective responses to the 
problems we face.  Simply decentralizing or networking is unlikely to do this.  
Despite the impossibility of squaring a circle, it has occurred at least once and 
might be made to happen more systematically.38 
The analysis of terrorism and networks suggests some more specific strategies, 
both short- and long-term. If our ability to affect mobilization and recruitment is 
limited in the short-term, we are likely to face a prolonged struggle. In this case, 
we should emphasize limiting the damage to ourselves that might occur during 
this struggle. If we are likely to confront militant Islamists for some time, then we 
should do our best to make sure that they can do us as little harm as possible.  
The greatest damage they can do would come from their use of weapons of mass 
destruction, principally biological or nuclear weapons of some sort.  
Consequently, our greatest efforts should now be spent on stopping the 
proliferation of those weapons and the materials that can make them.  The short-
term payoff in security is likely to be greater from counterproliferation than from 
the effort to capture or kill high-value targets (HVT).   
One might object that it is both necessary and possible to simultaneously 
target HVT and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, 
targeting HVT might be one of the best ways to stop proliferation.  In addition, 
effective measures against HVT and even the rank-and-file members of 
organizations will impair all the operational capabilities of those that threaten us.  
This is true but, as we have argued, the strength of our opponent’s recruitment 
and mobilization networks poses a limit to the effectiveness of targeting HVT.  
We should also recognize that there is likely to be a tension between 
counterproliferation and targeting: counterproliferation puts a premium on 
multilateral cooperation; targeting HVTs will often require unilateral action that 
will make multilateral action on other issues more difficult to achieve.39 At a 
minimum, we will face trade-offs between counterproliferation and targeting 
HVT.  When we do, the analysis of our opponent’s networks argues for putting 
the emphasis in the short-term on counterproliferation.    
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Putting an emphasis in the short-term on the multilateralism necessary for 
counterproliferation might also produce some long-term benefits. Lack of 
strategic command and control and thus the misuse of violence is one reason why 
the al Qaeda movement has not prospered, why it has lost support among the 
Muslim masses rather than gained it as it hoped to.40 That the militant Islamists 
have not suffered or the United States not benefited more from this declining 
support is owing largely to the loss of support that the United States has also 
suffered over the past several years.41  An emphasis on counterproliferation and 
multilateralism could be a significant part of the long-term effort to build support 
for the United States and its allies, especially if the conflicts in Iraq are resolved 
and the American presence there diminishes. The prospects for this approach 
look good. The same polls that reveal decreasing support for the militant 
Islamists show broad support, even in the Islamic world, for ideas (democracy, 
capitalism, and globalization) that are more congenial to the United States than 
to its enemies. Simply emphasizing these ideas is unlikely to be decisive, 
however.  We may be engaged in a struggle for public opinion and thus in a war 
of ideas, but especially in such a war, actions speak louder than words. 
Remembering this and acting accordingly will allow the greatest possible 
opportunity for our opponents to suffer from the isolation, insecurity, strategic 
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